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Abstract 
 
Previous research on the role of recognition in decision-making in inferential choice 
has focussed on the Recognition Heuristic (RH), which proposes that in situations 
where recognition is predictive of a decision criterion, recognized objects will be 
chosen over unrecognized ones, regardless of any other available relevant 
information. In the current study we examine the role of recognition in preferential 
choice, in which participants had to choose one of a pair of consumer objects that 
were presented with quality ratings (positive, neutral, and negative).  The results 
showed that participants’ choices were largely based on recognition, as the famous 
brand was preferred even when additional star ratings rendered it as less attractive.  
However, the additional information did affect the proportion of chosen famous items, 
in particular in the cases when star ratings for the recognised brand were negative. 
This condition also resulted in longer response times compared to neutral and positive 
conditions. Thus, the current data do not point to a simple compensatory mechanism 
in preferential choice: although choice is affected by additional information, it seems 
that recognition is employed as an initial important first step in the decision-making 
process. 
 
Keywords: brand, consumer choice, heuristic, preference, recognition heuristic, 
fluency, availability.
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Introduction  
 
Much advertising is generally based on the assumption of a strong link between brand 
recognition and consumer preferences (Hauser, 2011). Consider Benetton’s 
controversial but successful advertising campaigns in which the company’s brand was 
juxtaposed with shocking images (Gigerenzer, 2007). Many studies have shown that 
participants prefer stimuli they have previously seen even if they were not aware of 
them (Zajonc, 1968, Bornstein, 1989) and that people prefer things they are familiar 
with (Hoyer and Brown, 1990; Macdonald and Sharp, 2000, Coates, Butler, & Berry, 
2004, 2006).  
 The strong effect that recognition can have on people’s judgment has also 
been demonstrated in psychological decision-making literature. The Recognition 
Heuristic (RH), proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group (1999; 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) suggests that if one of two objects is recognized and 
the other is not, people usually infer that the recognized item has the higher criterion 
value regarding the particular judgment in question and thus choose it over the 
unrecognised one. The RH was originally tested by asking American participants 
which of two German cities had more inhabitants (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
Given a pair in which they knew one but not the other city (as was likely in this task 
for American students), participants predominantly chose the recognised city – a 
sensible and also successful strategy, because recognition in this task has a high 
validity in terms of city size judgment (recognised towns tend to be more populous, 
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). Consequently the RH is a non-compensatory decision 
mechanism because it relies on only one cue – recognition – even if other cues are 
available. For example, participants had earlier been told which cities had major 
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league soccer teams, a fact that would be a useful cue for making an inferential choice 
regarding the population size criterion. If subjects use the RH they should choose the 
recognized city regardless of whether it possesses a major league soccer team. The 
results indicated that participants did indeed follow recognition alone, choosing the 
recognized city 92% of the time
1
. Other work has also shown that the RH seems to 
explain decision-making in inferential choices when participants have to determine 
the size of endowments of American colleges (Hertwig & Todd, 2003), the incidence 
rate of diseases (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006), the prediction of success in sports (Pachur 
& Biele, 2007; Serwe & Frings, 2006), and the wealth of billionaires and record sales 
of musicians (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008). 
 The assertion that recognition affects inferential choice in a non-compensatory 
way as proposed with the RH was subsequently criticised and investigated. Numerous 
studies have produced results showing that other cues can have significant effects on 
inferential choices instead of, or in addition to, recognition (Oppenheimer 2003; 
Newell & Shanks, 2004; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Pohl, 
2006; Richter & Späth, 2006; Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks, 2010; Hochman et al, 
2010). Newell and Fernandez (2006) noted that Goldstein and Gigerenzer in their 
original study analyzed only what were the ‘critical’ pairs in which the recognised 
city did not have a soccer team. Analysing “corresponding cue pairs” in which the 
recognised city was also known to have a soccer team, Newell and Fernandez found 
that subjects were significantly more likely to choose the recognized city in this 
                                                 
1 This outcome based on the RH was also termed a “less-is-more-effect”, as 
American students who knew less about German cities and necessarily relied more on 
simple recognition outperformed German students who should have had an advantage 
(Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999). 
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situation than when it was known not to have a soccer team—thereby challenging the 
notion that recognition is always employed in a non-compensatory manner. 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) recently reviewed the research published in 
the decade following their initial work on the RH. They summarised the state of the 
evidence concluding that the basic assumptions of the RH have withstood numerous 
tests, provided three conditions were fulfilled and the RH was tested in its “domain”. 
These conditions were 1. that there is substantial recognition validity; 2. that 
inferences are made from memory, rather than from givens; and 3. that recognition 
stems from a person’s natural environment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011, p.101). 
Regarding the question of when the RH is applied (which includes the issue of non-
compensatory mechanisms) they state that:  “We postulate that individual recognition 
memory is the basis for the first of two steps by which an individual decides whether 
to rely on the recognition heuristic for solving a given task. The state of recognition 
memory determines whether it can be applied, while an evaluation process 
…determines whether it should be applied” (p.104). The authors therefore delineate 
the use of the RH not as an all-purpose mechanism, but rather as a mechanism 
selected “in an adaptive way that depends on the environment,” (p.104) to be used 
only if the ecological situation warrants it.  
Following Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s original paradigm, the bulk of research 
on the RH has largely focused on inferential choice—the realm in which it was 
originally conceived to apply. Participants have been asked which cities are larger, 
which stock will have most value, which team will win and which college is richer. 
But they have not been asked about their preferences: which one do you like; which 
one would you buy? Given the apparent importance of the ecological validity of 
recognition in decision-making, it is important to investigate whether the RH applies 
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in the preferential realm of – for example – consumer choice, with Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein themselves suggesting that the RH could also “serve as a model for 
preferences.” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011, p.113.)  
One recent example is a study by Oeusoonthornwatta and Shanks (2010) who 
tested the non-compensatory nature of the RH in the context of consumer preferences.  
In their experiments participants were told to memorize positive or negative 
statements about a range of consumer products (including tennis racquets, potato 
crisps, chocolates, ear phones and shower gels).  The statements were extracted from 
the media and frequently referred to the ethical practices of a company—2while others 
spoke strictly of quality and performance.
3
 After this information participants were 
then tested on the recall of the positive and negative statements. Finally participants 
were asked to perform an alternative forced-choice task in which they were shown 
pairs of images of consumer products of the same category (e.g., two brands of ear 
phones) from which they had to indicate which of the two items they were most likely 
to purchase. Of the ninety pairs thirty were critical pairs, in which a famous brand was 
presented alongside an obscure one. In ten of these, the famous brand had been 
preceded in the learning phase by a positive comment; in another ten the famous 
brand had been preceded by a negative comment; and in the final ten, the control 
pairs, no comment had preceded the famous brand.  
                                                 
2 For example: “Hershey import cocoa beans from the Ivory Coast, where there is 
intensive child labour and enslavement” 
3 For example: “Prince is the inventor of O3 Speedport design which is up to 24% 
faster through the air and has a sweet spot that is up to 59% larger than a traditional 
racquet.”  
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According to the original notion of the RH as a strictly non-compensatory 
decision strategy, the cue information should have no effect on participants’ choices, 
as only recognition should affect the subject’s decision. However, the results showed 
that the proportion of recognised options chosen were higher for positive than for 
negative critical pairs. The investigators concluded: “Thus contrary to the RH, 
recognition of consumer products is a compensatory rather than a non-compensatory 
cue.” (Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks, 2010, p. 315.) This conclusion fits with data 
from marketing science in which research shows that although recognition is an 
important factor in consumer choice, it is frequently only one of a number of cues 
considered (see Hauser, 2011).  
 However, the case against RH predictions from Oeusoonthornwatta 
and Shanks’ (2010) data is arguably not very strong. The mean proportion of choices 
for the recognised brand was only 63% across the three conditions. According to 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2011) definition of “boundary conditions” for the use of 
RH this may be interpreted a result of low recognition validity: brand recognition did 
not correlate with participants’ preference criterion (e.g., quality or desirability) to a 
substantial degree, and therefore the RH may not have been employed. In their 
review, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) report 48 studies on the RH, and in almost 
all of these studies – as far as they fall in the RH domain - recognition validity was 
above 70%. Although it is difficult to obtain a measure of recognition validity for 
preferential choice, conclusions about the use and non-compensatory nature of RH in 
this experiment may be limited – participants may simply not have used the RH to a 
great degree in the first place because of the lack of “substantial recognition validity” 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011, p. 104). In such a case people may resort to a 
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“recognition plus evaluation” mechanism (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011) in which 
they may overrule the recognition heuristic and look for other cues. 
 
A further factor mentioned in Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s review for the 
applicability of the RH is the presence of representative sampling and a well-defined 
reference class. In the Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks’ study the products were 
from unrelated categories such as crisps, tennis racquets, chocolates, soaps and 
earphones. Thus, it could be argued that their participants did not have a well-defined 
reference class, which would relate to a common (preference) criterion.
4
  
There is also another possible criticism of this type of study, which concerns 
the experimental paradigm. Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) taught their 
subjects a series of positive and negative statements about the recognised brands, and 
then tested their participants’ recall on this before running the choice trials, to make 
sure they had memorised the taught information. If subjects failed this test, they were 
then required to re-learn and be re-tested on the information before trials would be 
conducted. This procedure is likely to have produced possible task demand effects 
(participants may have expected to utilise the laboriously learned ethical cues at a 
later stage), and conflicts with Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (2011) notion that the RH 
should occur from natural memory rather than be experimentally induced. 
Another aspect of the study by Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) that 
warrants further investigation relates to the results: the compensatory effect of the 
                                                 
4 There is a great disparity in type between the products used in 
Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010). In our own experiment we selected 
products that were expensive consumer items purchased to last a considerable period 
of time, thereby constituting a more coherent reference class. 
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given positive or negative information was not very strong. For example, the 
difference between the control condition and the negative condition was not 
significant (Experiment 1). Therefore, the conclusion that recognition is used in a 
compensatory way might appear overly strong to defenders of the RH.  
One way to address these issues – and put the role of recognition in view of 
other cues in perspective – is to look at response times. For example, investigations in 
marketing science relate that negative information in particular causes increased 
deliberation (Hauser, et. al., 1993). Pachur and Hertwig (2006) employed response 
times in inferential tasks to measure whether the RH was used or whether recognition 
was integrated with other information, in which case participants were found to take 
longer for making their choices (because it takes time to retrieve additional 
information from memory). Measuring response times for choices will also better 
inform us as to whether participants’ recognition works as an all-or-nothing decision-
making process as originally proposed by Goldstein and Gigerenzer.  
Newell & Fernandez (2006) correlated decision latencies and participants’ 
proportion of choosing the recognised city to see whether the ease of recognition 
determines their decision. If the RH is correct, any variation in response times should 
be random. However, Newell and Fernandez (2006) found that there was a significant 
correlation between the time it took to recognise a city and whether it was later 
chosen from a critical pair.  
This finding was interpreted as a serious challenge to the RH – because in this 
case it would appear that other heuristics that rely on more effortful memory retrieval 
instead of recognition could also explain the effects attributed to the RH. For 
example, the availability heuristic  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and fluency 
heuristic (e.g. Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989, Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) also propose 
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that familiarity with items in memory influences recognition. If the ease with which 
an item is recognised or retrieved from memory determines its choice, then Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer’s (2002) claim that the RH employs ‘‘recognition as a binary, all-or-
none distinction’’ (p.77) cannot be upheld (see Newell & Fernandez, 2006, and 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011, for discussions). 
Therefore, in the current study, we seek to investigate the RH in a preference 
choice domain, following Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks’ (2010) but with some 
significant modifications to their experiment to address the issues mentioned above. 
As in the original study we ask people to indicate their preference for one out of a pair 
of consumer products, and our particular interest is in preference choices for pairs that 
have a famous (recognised) and obscure (non-recognised brand).  
In contrast to Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) in the current study the 
positive, neutral or negative cues for the consumer products were given directly as 
“consumer ratings,” which were presented as star ratings similar to those found in 
internet commerce. By so doing, we have arguably changed the context to a more 
ecologically relevant one, and this procedure did not induce any artificially rehearsed 
memories. Second, the product categories were changed to mostly technical long-
lasting consumer items (laptops, mobile phones, earphones, but also tennis racquets) 
to create a more homogenous reference class. Thirdly, we also record decision times 
to assess whether recognition is used as an (additional) information cue rather than an 
all-or-none heuristic (Newell & Shanks, 2004), for which we predict (following 
Newell & Fernandez, 2006) that neutral conditions (in which recognition is the only 
differentiating cue) are responded to faster than in the positive or negative conditions. 
Therefore we asked the following questions:  
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1. Do people use compensatory strategies in simple preferential choice 
problems that involve recognition? In line with Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks 
(2010) we would expect to find significant modulations of the proportion of 
recognised items chosen from a pair depending on the number of star ratings.  
2. Will response times indicate compensatory decision processes for all 
(positive and negative) conditions with an information cue (compared to a neutral 
cue)? According to the original conception of RH (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) 
recognition is the only cue and we would expect no differences in decision latencies 
whether the famous brand is accompanied by 5 stars, 3 stars or only one star (see also 
Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). In contrast, work from marketing research seems to imply 
that mainly negative information causes increased response latencies.  
3. Are decision latencies and choices based on recognition correlated across 
trials? According to Newell and Fernandez (2006), if recognition-based decisions 
were based on feelings of familiarity, then we would expect a negative correlation 
between the proportion of chosen items and response times, whereas the RH would 
predict no such relationship. 
 
Method 
Participants 
62 people participated in the study (mean age=32.2 years, SD 8.74), 40 of whom were 
female. Participants were recruited from the student body and members of the public 
at the University of East London (UEL). UEL’s ethics committee approved the 
experiment. Participants were not paid for their time. The experiment was run for 
each participant individually in meeting rooms on campus.  
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Design and Measures 
The study employed a within-subjects design measuring choice preferences using a 
two-alternative-forced choice procedure. The independent variable was the valence of 
cue information (positive, control, and negative) regarding the recognised item, and 
the dependent variable were participants’ choice responses and corresponding 
response times. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was written on E-Prime and run on a laptop computer. Each 
participant viewed 90 pairs of consumer products, one after another. Thirty of these 
were critical pairs, of which there were three kinds: control, positive, and negative. 
Every critical pair contained the image of a famous recognized brand, such as Apple, 
against the image of a more obscure one, such as Kyocera. The brand name was 
always beneath the image. The critical pairs are listed in the Appendix.  
 The products were selected from five categories: headphones, tennis racquets, 
laptop computers, cell phones, and cameras. Six famous brands were selected from 
each category to be compared with 6 obscure brands from the same category to make 
30 critical pairs. The resulting 30 pairs were divided into three sets of 10 products, 
each containing 2 exemplars of each category. The sets were either presented with 
positiv, neutral, or negative information regarding the famous brand. The particular 
items in each set were rotated for each participant so that a brand would be exhibited 
in all three conditions across participants. For the ‘control pairs’ both the famous and 
the non-famous brands were presented with three black stars (out of a possible five) 
underneath the brand name and image. For the ‘positive pairs’ the famous brand was 
presented with five stars and the non-famous brand with one star. In the’ negative 
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pairs’ the famous brand was presented with one star and the non-famous brand with 
five stars. 
 Before the program began, the participants read that they would see 90 pairs 
of consumer items, presented one after the other. Underneath each item would be the 
name of the manufacturer and a number of stars reflecting the popularity of the item. 
They were then instructed to decide which product they were most likely to buy in 
each pair. Each participant not only saw the thirty critical pairs, but also sixty non-
critical pairs randomly mixed in with the thirty so as to obscure the purpose of the 
experiment from participants. The non-critical pairs contained either two famous 
products or two obscure ones. As with the critical pairs, the image of the products was 
presented with the brand name beneath the appropriate picture, and the star ratings 
beneath the brand name. After they had completed the task the participants were 
asked to complete a recognition check. They were given a list of all the brands (on a 
sheet of paper) presented in the choice task and asked to tick which of the brands they 
had been aware of before they began the test. 
 
Results 
Recognition check 
In order to test if the Recognition Heuristic operates in the parameters described by 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), one item in the critical pair had to be recognised, 
and the other unrecognized. Following the preference choice phase of the experiment, 
a recognition test removed critical trials from the analysis in which the famous 
product was not recognized, or the non-famous item was recognised. On average, 
27% of the critical pairs were discarded because of this correction (compared to 30% 
in Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks, 2010). The mean number of pairs left after 
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correction were 7.38 (SD = 1.39) for positive pairs, 7.23 for negative pairs (SD = 
1.46), and 7.24 (SD = 1.45) for control pairs. 
Effect of the star ratings on choice 
For each of the conditions with critical trial pairs the mean proportion of choices of 
the recognized brand was calculated for each subject (see Figure 1 for the general 
means in each condition across subjects). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed with participants as cases and mean choice proportions in each of the three 
conditions (5, 3, or 1 star for the famous item) as repeated measures. Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated,  (2) = 10.33, p = .006, 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity ( = .86). A within-subjects ANOVA on mean proportion of chosen 
recognized brands revealed a significant main effect of condition (valence: positive, 
neutral, negative), F (1.73, 105.34) = 17.48, p < .001. There was a significant linear 
trend of condition (across the three valences), F (1, 61) = 28.22, p < 0.001. The 
quadratic trend was not significant, F (1, 61) = 2.68, p = .11.  
Tests of within-subjects contrasts revealed that the mean proportion of choices 
of recognized items was significantly higher in the positive (M = 84%) than in the 
control (M = 79%) pairs, F (1, 61) = 4.02, p  = 0.49. The difference between the 
control and negative (M = 65%) pairs was also significant F (1, 61) = 23.99, p <  .001. 
We further examined whether recognized items in neutral and negative conditions 
were chosen more often than chance (50%) by one-sample t-tests. In both cases the 
proportion was significantly different from chance, t (61) = 12.18, p < .001 (neutral), 
and t (61) = 4.98, p < .001. 
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Figure 1: Mean proportion (and standard errors) of the recognized product chosen in 
each type of critical pair (comprising a recognized and an unrecognized brands). 
Participants were shown star ratings for both items in a critical pair to result in 
positive, neutral, or negative additional information for the recognized brand. 
 
In summary, the results show that participants chose the recognized brand 
significantly more often when they were accompanied by five stars (positive) than 
when they were accompanied by three (control) or one (negative). They were also 
significantly less likely to choose the recognized brand when it was accompanied by 
one star than when it had 3 (control pairs).   
Individual differences 
Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) also tested for individual differences to 
check for the possibility that group averages could mask important individual 
differences (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Pachur et. al., 2008). Gigerenzer and 
Brighton (2009) reanalyzed the data of Richter and Späth (2006) and found that 
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although the experiment reported lower mean adherence to the RH at the group level, 
the majority of participants were in fact using the RH to make decisions. In other 
words, a small number of participants using an aggressively compensatory strategy 
might distort the overall means for the group, giving the false impression that a 
majority did not follow the RH, when in fact they did. 
 To prevent such a distortion in the results, we performed an analysis of 
individual choice strategies as suggested by Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks, 
(2010). A difference score ranging between -1 to 1 was calculated for each 
participant, based on the difference in the proportion of choices of the recognized 
brand between the positive and negative conditions. This score measures the 
compensatory effect of additional information—in this experiment the star ratings—
beyond the effect of recognition for every subject. If subjects follow the RH—
meaning recognition is employed in a non-compensatory manner—then the majority 
of participants should show no difference in their proportion of choices between 
situations in which the recognized brand received 5 stars (positive) and situations 
where the recognized brand received one star (negative), that is, most participants 
should have a difference score of zero.  
However, the majority (43/62) had difference scores above zero and only 
19/62 had difference scores less than or equal to zero. A sign test showed that the 
difference between the number of positive and negative scores was different from 
chance (p = 0.003). This confirms that the group level effect reported in Gigerenzer 
and Brighton (2009) did not occur here, similar to the results of Oeusoonthornwattana 
and Shanks (2010). Hence, in both studies, a majority of participants did not follow 
the RH—that is, they did not consistently use recognition in a non-compensatory way 
(see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Mean individual preferences according to the proportion of recognised items 
chosen in critical pairs (following Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). Each bar represents 
one participant, with the height showing the proportion of preferences (% from 0 to 
100%). The top, middle, and bottom panels depict how often each participant chose a 
recognized product over an unrecognized one when the former was shown with a 
positive, a neutral cue, or a negative cue. 
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In a final analysis we compared recognition adherence rates for the five different 
brand categories. A 3 (valence) x 5 (category) repeated measures ANOVA was run 
(missing data were replaced with column means). There was a significant effect of 
valence, F (1.74, 106.10) = 20.41, p < .001 (dfs Geisser-Greenhouse corrected), but 
not Category, F (4, 244) = 1.32, p = .26, and no significant interaction, F (8, 488) = 
1.23, p = .28. Crucially, choice rates for recognised items in critical trials were 
significantly higher than chance in all conditions (all ps < .05, one-tailed), meaning 
that choice was based on recognition across all product-categories.  
 
 
Response Times
To assess whether participants took longer in certain situations to make their choices 
in the critical trials, the mean response times (see Figure 3) were calculated for the 
three valence conditions. Only trials in which participants chose the famous items 
were analysed (one participant was omitted because of a missing cell – they never 
chose a famous item when presented with one star, leaving no latency in the negative 
condition). The mean response times were greater for negative (M = 2841 ms, SE = 
207 ms), than control (M = 2418 ms, SE = 140 ms) and positive (M = 2567 ms, SE = 
165 ms) conditions. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed (with participants as cases) on log-transformed latency means with average 
trial-number (indicating the average position in which critical items rather than filler 
items would appear for a subject) as a covariate. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated (Greenhouse Geisser epsilon = 0.85), 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity. There was a main effect of valence, F (1.67, 99.76) = 5.08, p = .008. 
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Planned contrasts revealed that the mean (log-transformed) response time for 
decisions made when the famous brand was shown in the positive condition 
(accompanied by 5 stars) was not significantly different from the mean response time 
when the famous brand was in the neutral condition, p = 0.36. Importantly for our 
hypothesis however, the mean response time for decisions made when the famous 
brand was in the negative condition (accompanied by one star), was significantly 
different from the control condition, p = 0.009. This confirms our hypothesis that 
subjects would take longer to make a choice when the famous/recognized brand
5
 was 
accompanied by negative information, and indicates a compensatory nature of their 
decision-making in this situation. It also supports other reports suggesting that 
negative information about a product is given more consideration than positive 
information (e.g., Hauser et al, 1993). 
 To see whether participants decision style regarding the compensatory or non-
compensatory use of recognition as measured by the differences score (proportion of 
positive minus negative choices) had an influence on response times we ran an 
additional ANOVA as above, but including difference score as a continuous variable. 
Results were very similar to above, with a main effect of valence, F (1.64, 95.57) = 
                                                 
5
 To check whether particular product categories could have driven this effect more 
than others we ran an ANOVA with the factor valence and added the factor product-
category (missing values were replaced by column means). The only significant effect 
was a main effect of Valence, F (2, 120) = 3.48, p = .03 (F-values for the main effect 
of product-category and the interaction were all < 1.39). Thus, the observed longer 
response times for negative recognised items was not driven by certain individual 
product categories. 
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4.973, p = .013. Crucially, there was no interaction between difference score and 
valence, F (1.64, 95.57) = 1.42, p = .25, indicating that there was no evidence that 
whether participants used recognition in a compensatory or non-compensatory 
manner influenced their response times for famous items. 
 
 Figure 3: Mean latencies in milliseconds (and standard errors) for each 
of the conditions in which a recognised item was chosen in a critical pair.  
 
Finally, we sought to assess whether adherence to familiarity-based choices 
depends on the time it takes to recognise items, and by extension whether recognition 
is based on an “all-or-none” process (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). We did not use 
a separate task (independent of the choice situation) to assess how fast participants 
recognised a famous item as done by Newell and Fernandez (2006) but instead we 
emulated their analysis by correlating preference for the recognised object with the 
corresponding response time in the neutral conditions only. We thus entered multiple 
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pairs of data points per participant
6
: the response time for each critical item-pair in 
which the famous was recognised, and 0 and 1 depending on whether the item was 
chosen. There was a significant negative correlation, r = - .134, p = .004. This result 
indicates that there is a relation between the speed with which participants chose a 
recognised item and their preference for a famous product, with faster response times 
when the famous item was chosen compared to when it was not chosen (but still 
having been recognised). Thus, there is evidence that recognition processes related to 
choice observed here seem not to rely on binary decision qualities (or an “all-or-none” 
process) but possibly on the ease of which items are recognised, the “availability” or 
“fluency” of recognition (see Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). 
Discussion 
The current study investigated the role of recognition in preferential choice, in 
particular whether there is evidence for a non-compensatory RH as proposed by its 
proponents (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). The 
results showed that participants rely to a substantial degree on recognition when 
making preferential decisions about consumer products. However, there was also 
evidence that recognition was used in a compensatory way: the presence of another 
cue—star ratings—significantly affected the number of times the recognized brands 
were chosen if one of the two items was famous. The results are broadly consistent 
with previous studies which found evidence for compensatory use of recognition in 
inferential choice (Oppenheimer, 2003; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Bröder and 
Eichler, 2006; Hochman, et.al., 2010) and consumer preference 
                                                 
6
 An additional analysis (with participants as cases) correlated the mean (log-transformed) response 
times for the recognised chosen items with the mean proportion of recognised items chosen by the 
participant in the neutral condition. There was no significant correlation, r = .011, p = 0.90. 
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(Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks, 2010). At the same time, there are indications that 
although the presence of additional cues affects preferential choice, recognition seems 
to be more than just another cue, contrary to what has been argued before (e.g., 
Newell & Shanks, 2004). First, recognized items are substantially preferred over 
unrecognised brands even if associated information about the former is clearly 
negative in comparison. Second, there is only a small difference in the use of 
recognition between the positive and neutral conditions, and third, response times to 
critical pairs in these conditions are equivalent. We will return to these points after 
discussing how the data fit with previous research on the RH and how our results 
relate more generally to observed effects of recognition in consumer choice. 
 There are some immediate concerns why the results of the current study may 
not extend to conclusions for the RH. First, the RH was formulated in the realm of 
inferential, not preferential choice (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 2011) and tests of the recognition heuristic have usually elicited judgments 
from participants by using memory cues only. The current study employed a slightly 
different paradigm, by examining preferential choice and using cue information that 
did not have to be memorized by participants. However, we argue that, along with 
previous work that has also presented cues not drawn from memory (Ayton, Onkal, & 
McPherson, 2011), the present findings are valuable for theoretical considerations of 
the RH. Gigerenzer and Goldstein themselves promote the testing of the RH outside 
its original domain, arguing the importance of defining “boundary conditions,” and 
have also noted the possibility that the RH might be applied to consumer choice 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011, p101 & 113). Furthermore, the current study has 
provided an ecologically valid context to examine whether the RH works in the 
preferential realm, because participants found themselves in a situation that was very 
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similar to a real-world situation—i.e. an online shopping experience—with 
information presented to them in the form of ratings or recommendations. The 
popularity of product-comparison websites suggests that people seek situations in 
which they have cues presented to them rather than having to rely on memory alone.  
Another possible criticism is related to one of the conditions deemed 
necessary for the RH to work – recognition validity. This means that recognition is 
only used successfully if it correlates with the criterion (e.g., that recognised towns 
tend to be more populous, Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). As we followed 
Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) by using consumer products and asking 
participants to indicate preferences, we have no clearly defined criterion that could be 
objectively used to assess recognition validity. However, given that we asked our 
participants to choose which item they were likely to buy, it seems plausible to 
suggest that our participants were trying to find an answer to the criterion: “which 
item is better?”  
To obtain a proxy for the recognition validity in the current study we searched 
for expert reviews regarding the shown product brands in the leading independent UK 
consumer magazine ‘ ’. In most cases, only the brands for consumer products 
we had chosen as “famous” were reviewed, and as such expert review scores could 
not be obtained for many non-famous brands. However, the very fact that products 
were deemed worthy of reviews by expert editors may in itself be an indication of a 
brand’s perceived quality, and in this case we gave the famous brand a score of 1, and 
the obscure brand a score of 0. In those rare cases in which non-famous brands were 
reviewed in , we looked at whether the famous brand received a better average 
review than the obscure brand  in that product category. If so, we gave the famous 
brand a score of 1 and the non-famous brand a score of 0, or vice versa if the non-
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famous brand received a superior rating. Across all five product categories, this 
method indicated a recognition validity of 83.2%, which is comparable to validities in 
traditional inferential research on the RH (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). 
On the other side of the theoretical argument, Newell and Fernandez (2006) 
previously tested the RH using a version of the city size task. In addition to examining 
the compensatory nature of recognition, their critical question was whether the RH 
could be distinguished from other heuristics relying on familiarity such as the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the fluency heuristic (e.g. 
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). In their study Newell and 
Fernandez found that the proportion of recognised cities chosen was negatively 
correlated with the time it took participants to recognise a famous city in a separate 
task (see also Marewski & Schooler, 2011). This was taken as evidence against the 
RH which proposes a binary (“all-or-nothing”) rather than a graded use of 
recognition. Although our test may admittedly be not as convincing as that of Newell 
& Fernandez (2006) - because we did not measure recognition times separately from 
choice situations – there is some support for this notion in our data: the time it took to 
choose a recognised item from a (neutral) critical pair and whether it was chosen were 
negatively correlated, indicating graded recognition processes instead of the supposed 
“binary” nature of the RH (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011).  
 
The current results are broadly consistent with the study of 
Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) indicating that recognition is not used as the 
sole cue in the realm of preferential consumer choice: people consider other 
information, whether positive or negative statements or consumer ratings, when 
making a decision. Participants do not follow the RH—that is, they do not use 
recognition in a strictly non-compensatory, all-or-none way. However, the 
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compensatory effect observed in this study is arguably not fully consistent with a 
simple cue integration model either. In such a model cues are integrated by a tallying 
or a weighted evaluation of the alternatives (Dawes, 1979), and therefore recognition 
would just be regarded as one cue that is qualitatively not different than other cues. In 
the present study, in contrast, there was only a small difference in the proportion of 
recognised items chosen between the control and positive conditions, while at the 
same time a considerable difference was obtained between the neutral and negative 
conditions. The effect size for the latter comparison (Cohen’s d = .30) was 
considerably greater than for the former (d = .12). Of course one could argue that this 
difference could be explained by the well-described ‘positive-negative asymmetry’, or 
the observation that “bad is more powerful than good”: a long list of studies report 
that negative information (items, events, personality traits, etc.) have more impact 
than positive (see reviews from Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; 
and Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Although this effect may play a role, it would still not 
diminish the special role of recognition, because participants in the current (and in the 
Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks) study overall preferred the recognised brand even in 
the negative conditions, and this was true for all product categories.  
Furthermore, there was no difference in choice latency between the positive 
and neutral conditions, while in the negative condition decision-making took 
significantly longer. If recognition and cue information were used as equivalent cues, 
then we would expect decision times to be longer in the positive condition to allow 
for the integration of these two pieces of information (compared to only one in the 
neutral condition). Importantly, there was also no interaction between effects of 
product category and valence, indicating that whatever additional information 
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participants may have derived from category-membership (e.g., price range) this did 
not interfere with recognition effects. 
The present study has produced results compatible with a two-stage decision-
making process: Overall, participants made swift decisions following recognition, 
provided there was no cue to contradict it, in which case response times were longer 
(see, Hauser et. al, 1993) and recognition had less of an effect on preferences. In a 
recent description of the RH model Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) propose an 
"evaluation" stage following the recognition of an object. However, while this notion 
of an evaluation stage mainly depends on the degree of ecological validity (i.e. a 
meaningful reference class, representative sampling of options, and sufficient 
recognition validity) the current data clearly show that recognition-based choices are 
modulated by the valence of cue information, rather than only by the adaptive value 
of the object set in consideration. 
 
Conclusion 
This study sought to determine whether the RH can account for how consumers make 
their decisions and whether recognition is used in a non-compensatory way (Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer, 2002). It partially replicated a previous study (Oeusoonthornwattana & 
Shanks, 2010) and found that at least for given negative cues, participants take longer 
and are relying less on recognition in preferential choice. However, recognition is a 
strong determinant of choice in all conditions. This has implications for model 
building in preferential (and possibly inferential) choice, in particular whether choices 
are made over multiple stages. Future studies should measure recognition latencies 
and choice times separately to establish if and at which point other information such 
as brand attitude and price are considered. 
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Appendix 
 
The Thirty Critical Pairs (Recognised brand marked with ‘+’) 
 
Headphones 
 
V-Moda and Apple+ 
Bose+ and Thomson 
Klipsche and Pioneer+ 
Sennheiser+ and Goldring 
Belkin and Shure+ 
Sony+ and Ultimate 
 
Tennis Racquets 
 
Babolat+ and Donnay 
Gamma and Dunlop+ 
Head+ and Prokennex 
Snauwaert and Prince+ 
Wilson+ and Greys 
Power Angle and Yonex+ 
 
Cameras 
 
Canon+ and Contour 
Vivitar and Sony+ 
Olympus+ and Mamiya 
Sigma and Panasonic+ 
Nikon+ and Aigo 
Veho and JVC+ 
 
Cell Phones 
 
Apple+ and Kyocera 
ZTE and Siemens+ 
Blackberry+ and Qualcomm 
Huawei and Sony Ericsson+ 
Samsung+ and Verizon 
TCL and Motorola+ 
 
Laptops 
 
Lenovo and Dell+ 
Sony+ and Hasee 
Apple+ and Positivo Informatico 
Asus and Toshiba+ 
Hewlett-Packard+ and Micro-Star International 
Itautec and IBM+ 
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